SHIELDING JOURNALIST-“BLOGGERS”: THE
NEED TO PROTECT NEWSGATHERING
DESPITE THE DISTRIBUTION MEDIUM
LAURA DURITY 1

ABSTRACT
The failure to agree on a sufficiently narrow definition of
“journalist” has stalled efforts to enact a federal shield law to
legally protect reporter-source communications from compelled
disclosure in federal court. The increasing use of the Internet in
news coverage and the greater reliance by the public on the
Internet as a news source creates further problems as to who
should qualify for federal shield law protection. This iBrief argues
that a functional definition of “journalist” can be created to shield
journalists from compelled source disclosure so as to protect the
free flow of information to the public, but limits must be set to
prevent abuse of such protection.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
This past year, Pulitzer Prize-winning New York Times reporter
Judith Miller was jailed for refusing to divulge a confidential source. She
was called before a grand jury investigation to reveal how she discovered
the name of covert CIA operative Valerie Plame. 2 In a separate case, U.S.
District Court Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson ordered five journalists to
pay $500 a day in civil contempt fines for failing to divulge the source
linking former Los Alamos scientist Wen Ho Lee to espionage on behalf of
China. 3 And in California, Apple Computers subpoenaed the email records
from three websites that published confidential product information in order
to uncover the names of alleged Apple employees who leaked trade secret
information to the site. 4 Even if the Apple case ultimately fails to examine
1

B.A. in Public Policy Studies, Duke University, 2000; Candidate for J.D.,
Duke University School of Law, 2007; The author would like to thank Professor
Erwin Chemerinsky for his guidance in the development of this iBrief.
2
See Jeffrey S. Nestler, Comment, The Underprivileged Profession: The Case
for Supreme Court Recognition of the Journalist’s Privilege, 154 U. PA. L. REV.
201, 201-02 (2005); Robert Zelnick, Journalists and Confidential Sources, 19
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 541, 541 (2005).
3
See Zelnick, supra note 2, at 543.
4
Kimberly Wimlot Voss, Will Lawmakers Raise Shields to Protect Bloggers?
ONLINE JOURNALISM REV., Oct. 13, 2005,
http://www.ojr.org/ojr/stories/051013voss/.
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the application of the reporter’s privilege to “bloggers,” the issue will
inevitably arise in another case. 5 Bloggers are a permanent fixture in the
twenty-four hour news cycle, 6 and the use of “blogs” as a method of
disseminating information can no longer be ignored. 7
¶2
These three situations illustrate the need for a federal shield law to
resolve the jurisdictional “patchwork” 8 of protection offered to a reporter’s
confidential sources. In some cases, compelled disclosure may be the
proper approach. Yet a consistent federal approach, upon which journalists
can rely when making promises of confidentiality to sources, is needed both
to effect justice and guarantee the public’s right to a free flow of
information.
¶3
The Supreme Court recently declined an opportunity to establish a
unified approach to reporter-source communications. In July 2005, the
Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari in the widely-publicized reporter
privilege case involving former New York Times reporter Judith Miller. 9
Had it granted certiorari, the Court could have clarified its opinion in
Branzburg v. Hayes, 10 which has been the seminal, although wholly
misunderstood, case addressing the constitutionality of the reporter’s
privilege. The Court’s refusal to hear the case and possibly clarify
Branzburg underscores the urgent need for a federal shield law. Such a law
would resolve policy tensions and ensure that journalists’ use of
confidential sources is protected in federal court.

5

Indeed, the Electronic Frontier Foundation has recognized and attempted to
quell the legal fears of journalist-“bloggers” by providing a free online legal
guide for bloggers at http://www.eff.org/bloggers/lg (last updated Nov. 18,
2005).
6
See, e.g., David L. Hudson Jr., Blogging, First Amendment Center,
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/press/topic.aspx?topic=blogging (last
visited Mar. 8, 2006) (“[T]hree amateur journalists at the Powerline.com blog
were primarily responsible for discrediting the documents used in CBS’s rushto-air story on President George Bush’s National Guard service.”).
7
“Blog” is a shortened form of “web log” and is defined as a “website in which
items are posted on a regular basis and displayed in reverse chronological
order.” WIKIPEDIA, THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blog
(last visited Mar. 9, 2006). A person who posts these entries is called a
“blogger.” Id.
8
Jennifer Elrod, Protecting Journalists from Compelled Disclosure: A Proposal
for a Federal Statute, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 115, 125-26 (20032004).
9
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005).
10
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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In response to the Court’s denial of certiorari in Miller, two federal
shield laws were introduced in Congress and are currently in committee. 11
These laws suffer from a similar problem as their rejected predecessors: an
over-inclusive definition of the term “journalist.” In order to have any
success in passing a federal shield law, a narrow definition of a “journalist”
is needed to calm fears that extending a reporter’s privilege could
compromise national security. The problem becomes how to define the
term “journalist” given the increasing use of the Internet as a modern
information source. 12 United States D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Judge
Sentelle framed the concerns about an over-inclusive federal shield law
when he asked whether, if a privilege is granted to bloggers,
¶4

would it not be possible for a government official wishing to engage in
the sort of unlawful leaking under investigation in the present
controversy to call a trusted friend or a political ally, advise him to set
up a web log (which I understand takes about three minutes) and then
leak to him under a promise of confidentiality the information which
the law forbids the official disclose? 13
¶5
Any definition in a federal shield law should act to protect those
journalists who use blogs as a medium for news distribution. But that
definition should also exclude those whose online postings do not serve the
informational needs intended to be protected by the reporter’s privilege. An
effective federal shield law will address the current phenomenon of
bloggers by providing a functional definition of “journalist,” applicable
regardless of the medium.
¶6
A restrictive definition would require Congress to make somewhat
arbitrary choices concerning who should qualify for the reporter’s privilege.
But overbroad, diluted protection would be similarly harmful. 14 Curbing
the scope of the definition of “journalist” under the statute will ensure
valuable, but qualified, protection for those who are serving to inform the
public. 15 This iBrief proposes that in order to qualify for protection a
journalist must satisfy specific criteria unrelated to his or her choice of
distribution method. The need to protect the use of confidential sources and
11

Free Flow of Information Act of 2005, S. 1419, 109th Cong. (2005); Free
Flow of Information Act of 2005, H.R. 3323, 109th Cong. (2005).
12
Linda L. Berger, Shielding the Unmedia: Using the Process of Journalism to
Protect the Journalist’s Privilege in an Infinite Universe of Publication, 39
HOUS. L. REV. 1371, 1390 (2003) (quoting Mike Godwin, Who’s a
Journalist?—II. Welcome the New Journalists on the Internet, 13 MEDIA STUD.
J. 38, 39 (1999) (“With a $1,000 desktop computer and a connection to the
Internet, anybody can reach an audience of thousands or millions . . . .”)).
13
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 397 F.3d at 979-80.
14
Hudson, supra note 6.
15
Id.
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create stability in the law merits the exclusion of some journalists. One
possibility is to exclude those bloggers or Internet journalists who are not
associated with an established news organization and do not significantly
further the dissemination of information.
¶7
Part I of this iBrief will set forth the current state of the law
concerning the reporter’s privilege. Part II addresses the current federal
shield law proposals pending in Congress and proposes that a more
restrictive definition of the term “journalist” is needed in order for a federal
law to be both enacted and effective.

I. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
A. Framing the Debate
¶8
The struggle over if and when journalists should be compelled to
reveal confidential sources or their notes is a struggle in which each side
purports to act in the public interest. 16 Journalists argue that subpoenas
undermine journalists’ ability to perform their constitutional function of
informing the citizenry, 17 while the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) asserts
that subpoenas allow for effective prosecution in criminal trials. 18
¶9
This is the first time since the 1970s that journalists have been
subpoenaed in such significant numbers. 19 Particularly worrisome is the
increase in the subpoenaing of journalists in lengthy civil cases in which a
news organization can be charged daily fines for years for contempt. 20 This
trend threatens the public’s right to know 21 by undermining journalists’
16

See Stephen Bates, The Reporter’s Privilege, Then and Now, Research Paper
No. R-23, The Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy,
Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government (2000), available
at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/presspol/Research_Publications/Papers/Research_P
apers/R23.pdf (discussing generally how prosecutors and journalists view press
subpoenas and recognizing obstacles to a reporter’s privilege).
17
Id. at 1.
18
Id. at 17 (describing the prosecutor and the journalist as “locked in a struggle
for democratic legitimacy”).
19
Jeffrey Toobin, Name That Source: Why Are the Courts Leaning on
Journalists, NEW YORKER, Jan. 16, 2006, at 30.
20
See, e.g, id. (relating that lawyers for Steven Hatfill at one point subpoenaed
thirteen news organizations in a lawsuit filed against the government for leaks in
his anthrax investigation case).
21
Former New York Times general counsel James Goodale and Joseph
diGenova, a federal prosecutor during the Reagan administration and an
independent counsel in the early 1990s, have rejected the notion that there is an
anti-media trend in the courts. Rachel Smolkin, Under Fire, AM. JOURNALISM
REV., Feb./Mar. 2005, at 18. Goodale estimated that 500 cases litigated in the
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ability to promise confidentiality to their sources. Without confidentiality,
the public will suffer. For instance, without promises of confidentiality, it is
unlikely that Washington Post reporters would have uncovered the
Watergate scandal. 22
¶10
Journalists also protect confidential sources in order to preserve
future sources. In one survey, just over 86 percent of the 711 journalists
questioned either mildly or strongly agreed that “the use of confidential
sources [was] essential to [their] ability to report some news stories to the
public.” 23 In addition, professional ethics codes require that journalists
protect their sources even when doing so means going to jail or paying hefty
fines. 24 Every major American news organization demands that journalists
uphold the promise of confidentiality they make to a source. 25

B. Common-Law Privileges
¶11
Testimonial privileges, including attorney-client privilege, doctorpatient privilege, spousal privilege, and most recently, therapist privilege,
have been recognized by the judicial system. 26 The reporter’s privilege is
much less established, and reporters are often compelled to reveal
confidential sources and information, whether published or unpublished. 27
This may be because most other judicially-sanctioned testimonial privileges

past 30 years have touched on the reporter’s privilege and that recent high
profile cases have focused increased attention on the issue. Id.
22
Berger, supra note 12, at 1375.
23
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8 n.4, Miller v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2977
(2005) (No. 04-1507) (citing First Amendment Center, Reporters and
Confidential News Sources Survey—2004, Mar. 7, 2005,
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?item=reporters_confidential_s
urvey_04).
24
Brief for the States of Oklahoma et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner
at 7-8, Miller v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005) (No. 04-1507).
25
See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 23, at 8 (citing American
Society of Newspaper Editors Statement of Principles, Art. VI (“Pledges of
confidentiality to news sources must be honored at all costs, and therefore
should not be given lightly.”), http://www.asne.org/index.cfm?id=888 (last
updated Aug. 28, 2002) and Radio-Television News Directors Association Code
of Ethics and Professional Conduct (“Journalists should keep all commitments
to protect a confidential source.”), http://www.rtnda.org/ethics/coe.shtml (last
visited Mar. 8, 2006)).
26
Nestler, supra note 2, at 212-13. In Jaffe v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996), the
Supreme Court recognized a privilege for psychotherapist-patient
communications.
27
See generally Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, The Reporter’s
Privilege Compendium, http://www.rcfp.org/privilege/index.html (last visited
Mar. 8, 2006).
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involve the protection of private information given to members of an
accredited profession, whereas journalism is less a profession than an
activity in which all citizens can participate. 28
The Federal Rules of Evidence state that testimonial privileges in
federal civil and criminal cases “shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in
the light of reason and experience.” 29 Congress rejected a rule that would
list and define the nine testimonial privileges recognized at the time of the
promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence 30 and instead adopted Rule
501, which allows for the continued “evolutionary development of
testimonial privileges.” 31 The legislative history makes clear that by
adopting a flexible approach to testimonial privileges, Congress anticipated
that federal courts would act to determine whether a reporter’s privilege
existed under federal common law. 32 Indeed, federal courts’ increasing
recognition of additional testimonial privileges reinforces the notion that
Congress did not intend for Rule 501 to freeze the law of privileges. 33
¶12

Despite the legislative history of Rule 501 and the recognition by
more than thirty state legislatures of the need to protect a reporter’s sources,
the Supreme Court has not recognized a reporter privilege. Further, the
Supreme Court’s refusal to grant certiorari in Miller suggests that the Court
is unlikely to recognize a reporter’s privilege in the immediate future.
Without federal recognition of a reporter’s right to protect the promise of
source confidentiality, any confidential information sought can be attained
simply by bringing the suit in federal court. Although some federal circuits
have found a common-law reporter privilege, such a circuit-by-circuit
approach only creates uncertainty in the law and has the same chilling effect
on investigative stories as the recognition of no privilege at all.

¶13

28

See Douglas McCollam, Attack at the Source: Why the Plame Case is So
Scary, COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REV., Mar./Apr. 2005, at 29, 33, available at
http://www.cjr.org/issues/2005/2/mccollam-plame.asp.
29
FED. R. EVID. 501; see Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 8-9.
30
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 23, at 21 (citing 56 F.R.D. 183,
230-61 (1972) (proposed Rules 501-513)).
31
Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 8-9 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47
(1980)).
32
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 23, at 22 (citing a statement by
Congressman Hungate, Chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, upon presentation of the Conference Report to the House, that
Rule 501 “permits the courts to develop a privilege for newspaperpeople on a
case-by-case basis,” 120 Cong. Rec. H12253-54 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974)).
33
See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 8-9 (“Rule [501] thus did not freeze the law governing
the privileges of witnesses in federal trials at a particular point in our history . . .
.”).
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C. Confusion Created by the Supreme Court in Branzburg v. Hayes
Branzburg, the only Supreme Court case to address the reporter’s
privilege, denied recognition of a constitutional or common law reporter’s
privilege, and the ambiguous outcome has led to three decades of assorted
judicial and legislative approaches to the reporter’s privilege 34 and
significant lower court confusion in how to apply the law. 35 Some federal
circuits and most state courts have come to recognize either a common law
or constitutionally derived reporter’s privilege despite the fact that the
majority opinion in Branzburg found to the contrary. 36 Significant
variations in the scope of the reporter’s privilege granted, however, have
created uncertainty in the law and, consequently, have weakened any
protection a privilege provides for the free flow of information.
¶14

¶15
In Branzburg, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment
does not protect a reporter from questioning by a grand jury concerning
confidential sources, provided the investigation was in good faith and not
merely to harass the journalist. 37 In a 5-4 decision, the Court expressly
rejected the argument that “the public interest in possible future news about
crime from undisclosed, unverified sources [overrides] the public interest in
pursuing and prosecuting those crimes reported . . . and in thus deterring”
future crimes. 38 The Court was unwilling to articulate a reporter’s privilege
when the First Amendment’s guarantee of a free press applies equally to
almost anyone: “the lonely pamphleteer . . . just as much as the large
metropolitan publisher.” 39 Rather, the Court left Congress the difficult task
of deciding who, if anyone, should have the protection of a reporter’s
privilege. 40
¶16
Justice Powell’s concurrence to Justice White’s majority opinion,
however, left courts an opening to recognize a qualified reporter’s privilege
subject to case-by-case judicial discretion,41 stating that any “asserted claim
34

See Berger, supra note 12, at 1390.
See 408 U.S. 665; see also Adam Liptak, The Hidden Federal Shield Law: On
the Justice Department’s Regulations Governing Subpoenas to the Press, 199
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 227, 231 (1999) (“Branzburg is a confusing 4-1-4
decision.”).
36
Nestler, supra note 2, at 224-26.
37
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707.
38
Id. at 695.
39
Id. at 704.
40
Id. at 706 (“Congress has the freedom to determine whether a statutory
newsman’s privilege is necessary and desirable and to fashion standards and
rules as narrow or broad as deemed necessary to deal with the evil discerned.”).
41
Berger, supra note 12, at 1390 (“In recognizing a qualified privilege, as
Justice Powell appeared to suggest, many lower courts also adopted the
balancing test specifically advocated by Justice Stewart in his dissent.”).
35
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to privilege should be judged on its facts by the striking of a proper balance
between the freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give
relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct.” 42 Allowing courts to
recognize this privilege on a case-by-case basis 43 has created confusion,
which Justice Stewart accurately summarized when he commented that in
Branzburg, “the Court rejected the [reporters’] claims by a vote of five to
four, or, considering Mr. Justice Powell’s concurring opinion, perhaps by a
vote of four and a half to four and a half.” 44
¶17
This circuit split has resulted in a range of protections for
journalists at the federal appellate level and a proliferation of state shield
laws. 45 Some circuits have expressed inconsistent views about how Justice
Powell’s concurrence affects the majority’s holding. 46 For example, in In
re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, the D.C. Circuit gave no weight to
Justice Powell’s concurrence 47 while, in Carey v. Hume, it had found that
Branzburg’s precedential value was “controlled” by Powell’s
concurrence. 48

42

Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710.
Id.
44
Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 635 (1975), reprinted
in 50 HASTINGS L. J. 705, 709 (1999), cited in Brief for the Center for Individual
Freedom as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 11, Miller v. United States,
125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005) (No. 04-1507).
45
See generally Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, supra note 27
(providing a database outlining the specifics of the law of journalist’s privilege
in each state and federal circuit); see also Karl H. Schmid, Journalist’s Privilege
in Criminal Proceedings: An Analysis of United State Court of Appeals’
Decisions from 1973 to 1999, 39 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1441, 1498 (2002)
(concluding that courts of appeals have applied varying standards for
overcoming privilege but have in general been more lenient in approving
prosecutors’ subpoenas than those served by the defendants in criminal cases).
46
Compare In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding a qualified
privilege based on the “plurality opinions” in Branzburg), with United States v.
Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 969 (5th Cir. 1998) (acknowledging the plurality of the
Branzburg opinion but rejecting the notion that Powell’s concurrence is “a
mandate to construct a broad, qualified newsreporter’s privilege in criminal
cases”); compare LaRouche v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir.
1986) (finding a broadly applicable reporter’s privilege based upon Justice
Powell’s concurrence) with In Re Shain, 978 F.2d 850, 852 (4th Cir. 1992)
(arguing that Justice Powell’s concurrence only “emphasize[d] the Court’s
admonishment against official harassment of the press”).
47
397 F.3d 964, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (concluding that “whatever Justice Powell
specifically intended, he joined the majority” in rejecting a First Amendment
reporter’s privilege not to testify before a grand jury).
48
492 F.2d 631, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 23, at 17-18 (describing this contradiction).
43
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Currently, only the Sixth Circuit has explicitly rejected the
existence of a qualified reporter’s privilege. 49 The Seventh Circuit has not
ruled conclusively in either direction, but a recent opinion indicates that the
reporter’s privilege will not be recognized. 50 Other circuits have recognized
a qualified reporter’s privilege but with variable levels of protection and
depending upon the type of proceedings. 51
¶18

¶19
Only four circuits—the First, Second, Third and Eleventh—have
found that the government’s interest in prosecuting a criminal trial does not
outweigh a journalist’s right to protect a confidential source under the First
Amendment and therefore, a case-by-case balancing test must be invoked.
52
These circuits have reasoned that Justice Powell’s concurrence created
49

See In re Grand Jury Proceeedings (Storer Commc’ns, Inc. v. Giovan), 810
F.2d 580, 584 (“[W]e decline to join some other circuit courts . . . [that have]
adopted the qualified privilege balancing process urged by the three Branzburg
dissenters and rejected by the majority.”). But see Southwell v. S. Poverty Law
Ctr., 949 F. Supp. 1303, 1312 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (finding a qualified reporter’s
privilege).
50
See McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2003) (warning that
courts recognizing a privilege over published or non-confidential information
“may be skating on thin ice”).
51
See, e.g., Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (recognizing a
First Amendment privilege against compelled disclosure in civil but not criminal
cases); Cervantes v. Times, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 992 n.9 (8th Cir. 1972) (also
recognizing a privilege in civil cases but not directly addressing criminal cases);
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 437 (10th Cir. 1977)
(recognizing a privilege in civil cases but not directly addressing whether
protection is available in criminal cases);.In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850, 852 (4th
Cir. 1992) (“[A]bsent evidence of government harassment or bad faith, reporters
have no privilege different from that of any other citizen not to testify about
knowledge relevant to a criminal prosecution.”); compare Shoen v. Shoen, 5
F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1993) (recognizing privilege in civil case) with Farr v.
Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975) (upholding privilege in criminal trial),
cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976), and, In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Scarce v.
United States), 5 F.3d 397 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting privilege in grand jury
investigations but failing to articulate a legally principled distinction between
criminal trials and grand jury investigations upon which their reading of
Branzburg is founded).
52
In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 2004); Gonzales v. Nat’l
Broad. Co., 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630
F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that “journalists possess a qualified
privilege not to divulge confidential sources and not to disclose unpublished
information in their possession in criminal cases”). The Third Circuit found that
“the interests of the press that form the foundation of the privilege are not
diminished because the nature of the underlying proceeding out of which the
request for the information arises is a criminal trial.” Id.; accord United States
v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1504 (11th Cir. 1987).
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the majority opinion and, therefore, it must be given significant weight. 53
Significantly, however, they define eligibility for protection based on the
writer’s purpose in gathering the news. Notably, the First Circuit has held
that
[t]he medium an individual uses to provide his investigative reporting
to the public does not make a dispositive difference in the degree of
protection accorded to his work.. . . [T]he courts will make a measure
of protection available to him as long as he intended “at the inception
of the newsgathering process to use the fruits of his research to
disseminate information to the public.” 54
¶20
Similarly, a federal district court determined who was entitled to
invoke a reporter’s privilege based on the purpose for which the person or
entity gathered news and not subject to formal employment with a news
organization. 55 These holdings support the theory that bloggers acting as
journalists should not be excluded from protection under the reporter’s
privilege merely because they have selected to use an online-posting format
or are not members of a traditional media outlet.

D. Current State Legal Landscape
¶21
Seventeen states at the time of Branzburg already had some type of
statutory protection over a journalist’s confidential sources. 56 Fifteen
additional states and the District of Columbia, accepted the Court’s
invitation in Branzburg 57 to fashion a “shield law.” 58 Of the nineteen
53

See United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1182 (1st Cir.
1988) (finding Justice Powell’s concurring opinion to be essential); In re
Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 680 F.2d 5, 8 & n.9 (2nd Cir. 1982)
(concluding Justice Powell’s concurrence “cast the deciding vote” in Branzburg
and thus, “his reservations are particularly important in understanding the
decision”); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 715-716 (3d Cir. 1979)
(employing Justice Powell’s balancing test and noting that he “cast the deciding
vote in Branzburg”); Caporale, 806 F.2d at 1504 (citing In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d
789, 792 (5th Cir. 1983) (upholding a First Amendment reporter’s privilege
based on a “careful reading of the plurality and concurring opinions in
Branzburg”)).
54
Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 714 (1st Cir. 1998).
55
United States v. Vastola, 685 F. Supp. 917, 925 (D.N.J. 1998) (extending
privilege to author of book about the mafia and President Reagan).
56
See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 689 n.27 (listing all the states with statutory
protection at the time of the decision).
57
See id. at 706 (“[T]here is also merit in leaving state legislatures free within
First Amendment limits, to fashion their own standards [based on] the relations
between law enforcement officials and press in their own areas.”).
58
As of 2005, thirty-one states plus the District of Columbia have state shield
laws. Ala. Code § 12-21-142 (1995); Alaska Stat. §§ 09.25.300-09.25.390
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states without statutory shield laws, courts in all but one state have
recognized a reporter’s privilege in one context or another. 59 Wyoming is
the only state that has remained silent on the issue. 60
State shield laws vary in the scope of the qualified protection
offered to reporter-source communications and information.61 In contrast to
federal courts, state statutes focus more on a journalist’s affiliation with a
news organization and less on the journalist’s motivation for
newsgathering. 62 For example, California’s shield law protects a “person
connected with or employed [by] a newspaper, magazine, or other
periodical publication, or by a press association or wire service, or any
person who has been so connected or employed.” 63 Delaware’s statute is
¶22

(2004); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 12-2214, 12-2237 (2003); Ark. Code Ann. §
16-85-510 (1987); Cal. Evid. Code § 1070 (West 1995); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §
1986.1 (West 1998); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-90-119 (2004); Del. Code Ann. tit.
10, §§ 4320-4326 (1999); D.C. Code Ann. §§ 16-4701 to -4704 (LexisNexis
2005); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 90.5015 (West 1999); Ga. Code Ann. § 24-9-30 (1995
& Supp. 2005); 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/8-901 to -909 (West 2002); Ind.
Code Ann. § 34-46-4-1 (West 1999); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 421.100 (LexisNexis
1992); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 45:1451-1459 (1999); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud.
Proc. § 9-112 (LexisNexis 2002); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 767.5a (West
2000); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 595.021 to 595.025 (West 2000); Mont. Code Ann.
§§ 21-1-901 to -903 (2003); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 20-144 to -147 (1997); Nev.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 49.275, 49.385 (LexisNexis 2002); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A21 (West 1994); N.M. Stat. Ann. §38-6-7 (LexisNexis 1998); N.Y. Civ. Rights
Law § 79-h (McKinney 1992); N.C. Gen. Stat § 8-53.11 (2003); N.D. Cent.
Code § 31-01-06.2 (1996); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2739.04, 2739.12
(LexisNexis 2000); Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2506 (2001); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 44.510.540 (2003); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5942 (2002); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 9-19.1-1 to -3
(1995); S.C. Code Ann. § 19-11-100 (2004); Tenn. Code. Ann. § 24-1-208
(2000).
59
Nestler, supra note 2, at 226 & n.123 (extensive list of state appellate court
decisions recognizing the reporter’s privilege).
60
Id. at 226.
61
See Laurence B. Alexander, Words That Shield: A Textual Analysis of the
Journalist’s Privilege, 18 NEWSPAPER RES. J. 51, 60-64 (1997) (describing the
wide variations in protection afforded under state shield laws).
62
See id.
63
CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 2(b); CAL. EVID CODE § 1070(a) (West 1995). See also
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 4320(4)(a) (1999) (extending protection only to those
who have earned “their principal livelihood by, or in each of the preceding three
weeks or four of the preceding eight weeks [have] spent at least twenty hours
engaged in the practice of, obtaining or preparing information for dissemination
. . . to the general public.”); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(a)(6) (McKinney
1992) (extending shield only to “professional” journalists who are
“professionally affiliated for gain or livelihood” with a traditional news media
organization).
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even more specific in its requirements, extending protection only to those
journalists who have earned “their principal livelihood by, or in each of the
preceding three weeks or four of the preceding eight weeks [to have] spent
at least twenty hours engaged in the practice of, obtaining or preparing
information for dissemination . . . to the general public.” 64 Generally, state
statutes define the protected class of journalists as those who “(1) . . . have a
substantial connection with or relationship to a recognized or traditional
news media entity, and (2) [are] engaged in recognized or traditional news
media activities.” 65
¶23
Although Alaska, Oklahoma, and Louisiana’s definition of a
protected journalist as someone “regularly engaged” in the business or
activities of journalism could be interpreted to include journalist-bloggers
who regularly post online, 66 no state court has yet addressed whether or not
a journalist-blogger would be covered by that state’s shield law. 67

E. DOJ Guidelines
¶24
The Department of Justice’s special guidelines with regards to the
subpoenaing of the news media reveal that journalists are not like other
witnesses subpoenaed in a trial. 68 Rather, the Department of Justice
acknowledges that it must “strike the proper balance between the public’s
interest in the free dissemination of ideas and information and the public’s
interest in effective law enforcement and the fair administration of
justice.” 69 Under the Guidelines, a federal prosecutor is required to (1)
weigh the effect of the subpoena against the fair administration of justice;
(2) make reasonable attempts to obtain the particular materials from
alternative sources other than the press; and (3) to obtain the Attorney
General’s authorization on all requests for subpoenas of the press. 70

Many journalists reject these guidelines as giving the Attorney
General too much discretion to decide when a journalist is privileged from
¶25

64

DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 4320(4)(a) (1999).
See Berger, supra note 12, at 1393 (analyzing the variation in the focus of the
reporter’s privilege protection offered under federal and state law).
66
ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.390(4) (2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 45:1451 (1999);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2506(7) (1993).
67
In California, the issue could be resolved on appeal in Apple Computer, Inc.
v. Doe 1, No. 1-04-CV-032178, 2005 WL 578641 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 11,
2005). Apple has charged three bloggers with publishing confidential product
information in violation of state law and seeks to compel the bloggers to divulge
which of Apple’s employees turned over the information to the bloggers. Id.
68
28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2003).
69
Id. at § 50.10 (a).
70
Elrod, supra note 8, at 154-55.
65
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disclosure. 71 Fighting a subpoena takes significant time and money and can
be disruptive to even the biggest news media organizations. 72
Consequently, subpoenas especially threaten to chill independent or nontraditional journalists. 73 Without a precise definition of the term
“journalist,” prosecutors can more easily subpoena confidential
communications from writers whose status as a journalist is unclear, such as
those who freelance or post gathered news in an online blog. 74 The
increasing use of the Internet by journalists to distribute information and by
the public to receive information makes this ambiguity all the more
worrisome.
More important still, the District of Columbia Circuit Court has
concluded that the Guidelines, “merely guide the discretion of the
prosecutors,” 75 so if the DOJ fails to follow its own internal guidelines a
journalist has no legal recourse to seek their enforcement. 76 In order to
enforce the promise made to their sources, journalists should not be
dependent on the discretion of the DOJ to weigh their interests.
¶26

II. CALL FOR FEDERAL SHIELD LAW
As recently as July 2005, the Court refused to grant certiorari to
resolve the irreconcilable conflicts between the circuits that have developed
over the recognition of the reporter’s privilege. 77 The Supreme Court’s
refusal to address this diverse and uncertain legal landscape that has
developed in the wake of Branzburg’s unclear majority opinion makes it all
the more necessary for Congress to step in to protect the informational
interests of American citizens. Indeed, by refusing to re-address the issue,
the Supreme Court has implicitly deferred to Congress to enact a law that
will resolve current tensions in federal reporter privilege law by articulating
a functional definition for the category of journalists to be protected.
¶27

¶28
Legislation is needed to resolve uncertainties in the law, articulate a
consistent scope for the privilege, and strengthen reporters’ confidence in
any promise of confidentiality offered to a source. 78 Most importantly, a
consistent national definition of the “journalist” to be covered by the
privilege is needed. Without legislation the approach to whether journalistbloggers qualify for the reporter’s privilege will be inconsistent and
unpredictable. The current hodge-podge of approaches requires journalists
71

See id.
Id.
73
Id.
74
See id.
75
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 976 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
76
Id. at 975.
77
See Miller, 125 S. Ct. 2977.
78
See Nestler, supra note 2, at 234.
72
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to know the scope of any shield law or common law privilege in a certain
state or circuit at a particular time. 79 For journalists whose medium is the
Internet, it is even less clear whether a circuit’s or a state’s definition of the
reporter’s privilege will apply. A consistent federal approach in particular
is needed in order to guarantee that journalists continue to report on federal
government misconduct—information that journalists can often only obtain
through confidential insider sources.

A. Why a Federal Shield Law Is Essential
There are four primary reasons why a federal shield law is needed
to protect reporter-source communication. The first reason is to recognize
the states’ interest in protecting confidential sources. 80 A party should not
be able to compel disclosure of a journalist’s source or notes by suing in
federal court. 81 This federal loophole undermines the interest of forty-nine
states in upholding the reporter’s privilege made plain either by judicial
determination or through the enactment of state shield laws. 82 The source
loses confidence that his or her identity will be protected when a journalist
may be called into federal court where state shield law protection will not
apply, and the journalist left will have a choice between violating a court
order and going to jail or divulging the source and breaking a professional
promise. 83
¶29

¶30
Second, uncertainty among the federal circuits concerning the scope
of the reporter‘s privilege chills journalists’ use of anonymous sources and
results in a reduction in the flow of information to the public. 84 Subpoenas
burden future news reporting 85 and should be quashed except when the

79

See id.
See Free Flow of Information Act of 2005, Hearing on S. 1419 Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (Oct. 19, 2005) (statement of Anne
Gordon, Managing Editor of the Philadelphia Inquirer) (“Without a federal
shield law, a source cannot be confident that his or her identity will be protected
as Pennsylvania law contemplates. If a journalist is subpoenaed in federal court,
even though the reporting was done in Pennsylvania, the journalist can be
ordered to disclose a confidential source something that the Pennsylvania
legislature has otherwise prohibited in our Commonwealth.”).
81
Id.
82
See Nestler, supra note 2, at 239-40 (explaining that developing a working
knowledge of all the relevant reporter’s privilege laws is burdensome for
journalists).
83
Id.
84
Id. at 239.
85
Bates, supra note 16, at 10 (“Subpoenas are inherently, invariable,
inescapably burdensome. They devour time and resources that recipients would
rather devote to other matters.”).
80
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prosecutor can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the
information is essential and cannot be obtained in any other manner. 86
¶31
Third, a recent increase in the subpoenaing of journalists has
contributed to an increased fear that the independent press has been
“press[ed] into an investigative arm of the government.” 87 Unless
unattainable through any other source, litigants, prosecutors and criminal
defendants should conduct their own investigations and should not rely on
journalists at the expense of the public’s informational interests. 88

Lastly, a federal shield law is needed to address a problem faced by
all federal and state courts: In today’s modern information age, who
qualifies as a journalist? Unambiguous criteria applied equally by all
federal courts would provide notice of protection to journalists and enable
other writers to gain protection if needed by altering their behavior.
Furthermore, such a definition would provide guidance to state courts
struggling to interpret the vague language in their own shield laws. 89

¶32

B. Current Federal Shield Law Proposals
Since Branzburg, there have been frequent calls for a federal shield
law. Indeed, in the six years following Branzburg, approximately one
hundred federal statutes were introduced. 90 The failure of any of the
proposals to pass can be attributed both to the press’s insistence on an
absolute, not qualified, privilege and the inability to reach a consensus on
the definition of a “journalist.” 91

¶33

Two similar bipartisan bills currently pending in both the Senate 92
and the House, 93 labeled the “Free Flow of Information Act of 2005,” were
introduced largely in response to the jailing of New York Times reporter
Judith Miller. 94 The legislation would prevent government officials from
compelling a reporter to reveal a source unless it was determined by clear
and convincing evidence that “disclosure of the identity of the person is
necessary to prevent imminent and actual harm to national security.” 95 The
language of the proposals covers “any entity that disseminates information
by print, broadcast, cable, mechanical, photographic, electronic or other
¶34
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S.1419, 109th Cong. §§ 1-5 (2005).
Bates, supra note 16, at 1.
88
See Elrod, supra note 8, at 164-66.
89
Id. at 150.
90
Berger, supra note 12, at 1391-92.
91
Id. at 1392.
92
S.1419, 109th Cong. §§ 1-5 (2005).
93
H. R. 3323, 109th Cong. §§ 1-5 (2005).
94
Voss, supra note 4.
95
S.1419 at § 2(a)(3)(A).
87
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means” and “any employee, contractor, or other person who gathers, edits,
photographs, records, prepares, or disseminates news or information for
such an entity.” 96 The addition of “or” before the word “disseminates” acts
to extend the reporter’s privilege to almost anyone. It is hard to imagine
who would be excluded from the broad definition proposed.
¶35
The Free Flow of Information Act is likely to follow in the
footsteps of its predecessors because, like other failed federal shield law
proposals, it fails to provide a definition of “journalist” that addresses
modern information technology. It is unclear if bloggers would be
protected under the Act. Senator Richard Lugar, sponsor of the bill, told a
journalism conference that bloggers should “probably not” be considered
real journalists and subject to the bill’s protection. 97 Given the ease with
which anyone can become a “blogger,” such a vague definition of the term
“journalist” could be interpreted broadly to include nearly every print,
broadcast, or online writer, or it could be interpreted narrowly to exclude
online newspostings altogether. A definition setting forth a set of criteria
that must be satisfied in order to qualify for a federal shield law’s protection
is needed so as to limit the discretion of the court in applying the statute,
increase certainty and predictability in the law, provide notice to all writers
promising confidentiality to a source, and bolster the legitimacy of the
reporter’s testimonial privilege. 98

C. Proposed Definition of the Term “Journalist”
¶36
In order to avoid the dangerously broad definition proposed in the
Free Flow of Information Act, the author of this iBrief recommends that any
proposed federal shield law should cover only those journalists who
function as journalists. A two-part functional test, adapted from the current
federal and state court approaches to reporter‘s privilege, should be used to
determine who is acting as a journalist and thus qualifies for protection
under the federal statute. 99

96

Id. at § 5(2)(C).
Anne Broache, Senators: Bloggers May Not Be True Journalists, NEWS.COM,
Oct. 19, 2005,
http://news.com.com/Senators+Bloggers+may+not+be+true+journalists/21001047_3-5902539.html.
98
Cornell University Law Professor Steven Clymer spoke on a panel expressing
reservations about the Free Flow of Information Act. He argued that the current
wording of the bill would apply to “bloggers.” Id. The inclusion of “bloggers”
would be a “‘dangerously broad’ move that would undermine the idea of
granting privileges at all.” Id. (quoting Professor Clymer).
99
See Berger, supra note 12, at 1387-94 (comparing the application of the
reporter’s privilege in state and federal courts).
97
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First, to qualify for a journalists’ privilege, the writer must intend to
disseminate information to the public at the time the information was
gathered. 100 The gathering of information for private purposes should not
be covered. 101 Second, a writer fails to qualify as a “journalist” unless he or
she has a substantial connection with or a relationship to an established
news media organization such that there is sufficient editorial oversight.102
A hierarchy of editors who must review the accuracy of the work before it is
published or posted online creates accountability. Such a criterion in the
definition avoids any concerns that “the relative anonymity afforded
bloggers, coupled with a lack of accountability” will create “a certain
irresponsibility when it comes to accurately reporting information.” 103
¶37

¶38
Requiring an intent to disseminate and editorial oversight
sufficiently narrows the category of journalists to be covered by a federal
shield law to those writers who are professional journalists. Because
journalists are not licensed and the practice of journalism does not require
an advanced degree, it is difficult to distinguish the serious truth-telling
journalist engaged in furthering the public’s right to know from a fabricator
who seeks a privilege with the purpose of exploiting First Amendment
protection and compromising the justice system. 104 Furthermore, this
author’s proposed definition covers those journalists who use blogs as a
mere distribution device for their work. 105 Specifically, those journalists

100

Id. at 1391.
The Second Circuit did not allow the author of a manuscript on the accused
murderer, Clause Von Bulow, to benefit from the privilege because the author
“gathered information initially for purposes other than to disseminate
information to the public.” Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 146 (2d
Cir. 1987). The court found that the author commissioned reports on the life
styles of Von Bulow’s wife’s children with no intention of disclosing them to
the public. Id. at 145.
102
See also, Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1993) (explaining that
it makes no difference whether “[t]he intended manner of dissemination [was]
by newspaper, magazine, book, public or private broadcast medium, [or]
handbill because ‘[t]he press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort
of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.’” (quoting
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938))).
103
See Broache, supra note 97 (quoting the statement Senator John Cornyn of
Texas prepared for a Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on the current
reporter privilege legislation).
104
See Berger, supra note 12, at 1391 (“There is no need for shield law
protection for writers and publishers of fiction. Such writers are unlikely to
require the kinds of continuing relationships with sources that lead to obtaining
and publishing truthful information.”).
105
See Voss, supra note 4 (“Washington attorney Laura Handman, who handles
subpoena issues for journalists, says there is no reason bloggers should be
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who are bloggers will satisfy the criteria for protection. But the selfabsorbed blogger whose postings do not serve the informational public
good and who lacks sufficient institutional oversight will not qualify as a
“journalist” and, therefore, will not be extended protection.

III. CONCLUSION
¶39
A federal shield law is needed to protect both traditional and nontraditional journalists, such as bloggers, in order to ensure the subpoenaing
of journalists in criminal and civil proceedings does not unnecessarily
burden the public’s constitutional right to information. A federal law that
only vaguely defines who qualifies for protection would give far too much
discretion to courts and will fail to standardize the current disarray of legal
approaches to the reporter’s privilege. Consistency is needed to reassure
journalists that promises of confidentiality to sources can be upheld and
thereby, guarantee sources for future important news stories.
¶40
Moreover, a federal shield law’s definition of “journalist” should
not be predicated on the form of the journalist’s expression. 106 Rather, the
law should seek to protect the journalist’s newsgathering tactics in order to
ensure an informed citizenry and safeguard democracy. The current bill
proposals are inadequate because, for a federal shield law to offer
meaningful reporter-source protection, it must apply only to a restrictive
category of journalists. Limitations on the shield law protection will ensure
the exclusion of writers seeking information only for personal gain and who
take advantage of the ability provided by the Internet to post
instantaneously before verifying the accuracy of the information. If a
blogger gathers information with intent to disseminate and is subject to
editorial oversight, he or she is a journalist, and therefore, should be
extended protection. Moreover, the definition of “journalist” proposed here
can also adapt as sources of information continue to grow and evolve in the
digital era.

denied the same rights as traditional journalists—if their intention is to operate
as journalists.”).
106
See Berger, supra note 12, at 1410.

